| 1  | SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA MIAMI   |  |  |
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| 3  | CASE NO. 17-CV-23429-MGC   |  |  |
| 4  | MICHAEL LAVIGNE, JENNIFER  |  |  |
| 5  | LAVIGNE, CODY PYLE, JENNIFER RIBALTA, JEFF RODGERS, IZAAR August 22, 2018                        |  |  |
| 6  | VALDEZ, AND FELIX VALDEZ, Plaintiffs   |  |  |
| 7  | VS.  |  |  |
| 8  | INTERNATIONAL OF ÁMERICA INC,  |  |  |
| 9  | ET AL.,<br>Defendants.   |  |  |
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| 11 | MOTIONS HEARING  |  |  |
| 12 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE MARCIA G. COOKE,  |  |  |
| 13 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE   |  |  |
| 14 | APPEARANCES  |  |  |
| 15 |  |  |  |
| 16 | FOR THE PLAINTIFF: <b>ETAN MARK</b> , ESQ<br>MICHAEL LAVIGNE, <b>LARA MCDONNELL-GRILLO</b> , ESQ |  |  |
| 17 | JENNIFER LAVIGNE, CODYMark Migdal Hayden PYLE, JENNIFER 80 SW 8th Street, Suite 1999             |  |  |
| 18 | RIBALTA, JEFF RODGERS, Miami, FL 33130<br>IZAAR VALDEZ, AND (305) 374-0440                       |  |  |
| 19 | FELIX VALDEZ Ètan@markmigdal.com   |  |  |
| 20 | Lara@markmigdal.com  |  |  |
| 21 | JASON M. JONES, ESQ  |  |  |
| 22 | 1147 Hunter Avenue<br>Columbus, OH 43201   |  |  |
| 23 | (312) 237-0275<br>Jason@jonesatlaw.com   |  |  |
| 24 |  |  |  |
| 25 |  |  |  |
|    |  |  |  |
|    |  |  |  |

| 1  | FOR THE DEFENDANT:   | TODD A. LEVINE, ESQ  |
|----|--|--|
| 3  | HERBALIFE LTD, HERBALIFE INTERNATIONAL INC, HERBALIFE INTERNATIONAL OF | ERIN E. BOHANNON, ESQ<br>Kluger Kaplan<br>Miami Center, 27th Floor<br>201 S. Biscayne Boulevard<br>Miami, FL 33131 |
| 4  |  |  |
| 5  | AMERICA INC, ET AL.  | (305) 379-9000<br>Tlevine@klugerkaplan.com   |
| 6  |  | Ebohannon@klugerkaplan.com   |
| 7  |  | MARK T. DROOKS, ESQ<br>Bird Marella PC   |
| 8  |  | 1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor<br>Los Angeles, CA 90067<br>(310) 201-2100                                      |
| 9  |  | Mdrooks@birdmarella.com  |
| 10 | FOR THE 44 INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS:                                      | MICHAEL S. CATLETT, ESQ<br>Quarles Brady LLP   |
| 11 |  | One Renaissance Square Two North Central Avenue  |
| 12 |  | Phoenix, AZ 85004<br>(606) 229-5200  |
| 13 |  | Michael.catlett@quarles.com  |
| 14 |  | <b>ZACHARY S. FOSTER</b> , ESQ<br>Quarles Brady LLP  |
| 15 |  | 101 E. Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 3400<br>Tampa, FL 33602  |
| 16 |  | (813) 387-0273<br>Zachary.foster@quarles.com   |
| 17 |  | ·  |
| 18 | REPORTED BY:   | <b>GIZELLA BAAN-PROULX</b> , RPR, FCRR<br>United States Court Reporter<br>400 North Miami Avenue, Suite 8S32       |
| 19 |  |  |
| 20 |  | Miami FL 33128<br>(305) 523-5294   |
| 21 |  | gizella_baan-proulx@flsd.uscourts.gov  |
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (The following proceedings were held in open court.) 3 THE COURT: We're on the record in Rodgers vs. Herbalife. MR. MARK: Etan Mark from the law firm Mark Migdal 05:13 I'm here with my co-counsel, Jason Jones, and my Hayden. partner, Lara Grillo. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. And appearing on behalf of the defendants? MR. LEVIN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. On behalf of 05:14 10 the defendants, Herbalife LTD,, Herbalife International, Inc., 11 and Herbalife International of America, Inc., Todd Levin and 12 13 Erin Bohannon from the law firm of Kluger Kaplan, and our co-counsel pro hac vice Mark Drooks from the law firm of Bird Marella. 05:14 15 MR. CATLETT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is 16 Mike Catlett. I'm from the law firm of Quarles Brady. I hope 17 it suffices to say that I represent 44 individual defendants in 18 19 the case. 05:14 20 THE COURT: I'll take your word for it. You don't have to announce each one of them on the record. 21 22 MR. CATLETT: I'm here with my colleague, Zac Foster, who is with our Tampa office, and he's local counsel for our 23 clients in this case. 05:14 25 **THE COURT:** All right. There are two motions.

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                  There's defendant's motion to compel arbitration and
        motion to transfer venue, and they are the two combined
        motions.
                  So counsel, are the defendants, are you going
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        separately? Together? Which defendants are going to speak on
        what topics? Plaintiffs, you may have a seat.
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                  MR. DROOKS: Your Honor, I'm going to speak to
        questions 2, 3 and 4, in your order. And then Mr. Catlett will
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        address question 1 which relates primarily to the individual
        defendants and then any other issues relating to them. And
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        we'll argue those issues as to both motions at once.
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                  THE COURT: All right. Go right ahead please.
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                  MR. DROOKS: Thank you, Your Honor. May I use the
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        lectern?
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                  THE COURT:
                              Right.
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                  MR. DROOKS: Thank you. Your Honor, as I said a
        moment ago, I plan to address the last three questions in your
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        order setting oral argument and leave for Mr. Catlett the first
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        question relating to the agency relationship. But I'm prepared
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        to answer any and all questions you may have.
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                  So to, in essence, cut to the chase to directly answer
        the questions that you had asked in your order, the defendant's
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        position is that four of the defendants who executed
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        distributorship agreements between January 2010 and August
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docket entry number 62; the other is docket entry number 63.

2013, are subject to the forum selection clause in the
distributor agreement and they are indicated here, Patricia and
Jeff Rodgers, Izaar Valdez and Jennifer Ribalta. Four of the
defendants are subject to an arbitration clause in their
distributorship agreement. Jennifer Lavigne, Michael Lavigne
by virtue of being Jennifer's husband and Cody Pyle executed
agreements after August 2013. And those agreements contained
distributorship -- excuse me, contained arbitration agreements,
and also contain a class action waiver. Felix Valdez had
executed an agreement in 2008. And his agreement also contains
an arbitration clause and a class action waiver.

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Our position is that irrespective of the contents of the agreements, all of the plaintiffs are subject to the arbitration clause and class action waiver in the rules.

In addition, with respect to the question relating to the Bostick settlement, Patricia Rodgers, Jeff Rodgers, Izaar Valdez and Felix Valdez are all Bostick class members and are all members of the Bostick class subject to the Bostick release.

Let me see if I can explain how we get to this which, I assume, is what interests the Court. I put on a timeline the membership dates for each of the respective plaintiffs. Izaar Valdez, as you can see, was terminated in June 2011, and signed up again in June of 2013, and was again terminated in June of 2016. So the relevant dates for Izaar Valdez are 2013, not

2008.

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So beginning at the beginning, so to speak, Felix

Valdez executed a membership agreement on June 15th, 2008, or as of June 15th, 2008, which contains an arbitration clause in it. The arbitration clause is shown here, it's part of Roman's declaration, Exhibit M, and it contains, although I failed to highlight it, about two-thirds of the way down, a separate class action waiver which reads, "Herbalife and I agree that no claim shall be adjudicated in an arbitration or in any judicial proceeding as a class action, and that no arbitration or other proceeding conducted pursuant to this agreement shall allow class claims or consolidation to a joinder of other claims or parties. It is a very broad arbitration clause relating to any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to my distributorship including," and it goes on.

In January 2010, the membership agreement, distributorship agreement was amended and, indeed, the arbitration clause was taken out and a forum selection clause was placed in the agreement. Between January 2010 and August of 2013, plaintiffs Patricia Rodgers and, indirectly, her husband Jeff, Jennifer Ribalta and Izaar Valdez all executed that form of agreement. That form of agreement which, as I said, does not contain an arbitration clause, contains this clause which provides that any claim shall be resolved exclusively in a judicial proceeding in either the Superior

1 Court or the United States District Court, both located in Los 2 Angeles, California.

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Now, Your Honor's question actually did not specifically relate to which plaintiffs but which claims, and the case law is quite clear that this agreement which at first said any claim encompasses all of the claims at issue in this case. Those cases are cited in our moving papers and, again, in our reply papers. I'm happy to discuss them at length. But they are American Residential Equities and the PODS case, cited at page 10 of our moving papers.

That's when things get interesting, Your Honor. The Bostick class action complaint is filed in April 2013, and as you can see, Mr. Valdez, Patricia Rodgers, Jennifer Ribalta and Izaar Valdez were all already members and were within the scope of the putative class in Bostick.

In August 2013, after the Bostick complaint had been filed and motion practice had proceeded in that case, Herbalife began to incorporate in its arbitration -- in its distributorship agreement, arbitration clauses and a class action waiver directly into the agreement. In July 2014 and December 2014, Mr. Pyle in July 2014, Jennifer Lavigne in December 2014, executed that agreement which directly contains in the agreement a broad form arbitration clause to which they are subject.

At the same time. Herbalife added an arbitration

clause and class action waiver to its rules. The rules are
directly referred to and incorporated into the agreement
itself, for example, in Ms. Rodgers' agreement, the agreement
reads, "Those documents and such other rules and procedures as
Herbalife has published or in the future may publish together
with such modifications and amendments as Herbalife shall make
from time to time in its sole and absolute discretion.
Collectively, the rules are each hereby incorporated into this
greement of distributorship, each in its most recently
published form."

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So the incorporation of the rules which were first incorporated in August 2013 and made available through the website in October 2013 and, thereafter, sent by direct notice to each of Herbalife's members in February 2014, place Felix Valdez, Patricia Rodgers, Jennifer Ribalta and Izaar Valdez within the scope of the arbitration agreement.

The agreement, as the Court will see from reviewing Romans' declaration entered today, contains a very clear indication that it was an arbitration agreement, it involves a waiver of jury trial and a waiver of class action.

The Bostick case proceeds. A settlement is reached. And the settlement became effective on September 18th, 2015, which was the last day for an objector to appeal the final judgment in the case.

Now, that settlement agreement covered everyone in the

1 Bostick class with some exceptions, Your Honor, and for our
2 purposes, the Bostick class period and the Bostick settlement
3 reached -- and that is the Bostick release -- reached Felix
4 Valdez, Patricia and Jeffrey Rogers, and Izaar Valdez. It did
105:26 5 not reach Cody Pyle and Jennifer Lavigne because he had
6 executed the new arbitration clause and class action waiver
7 agreements, and there was a specific carve-out for class
8 members who had executed that agreement after, I believe,
9 August or September 2013, to specifically accept them out of

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the settlement.

It did not reach Jennifer Ribalta because Jennifer Ribalta was one of about 15 hundred members who had achieved what's called, "Get Team" status, one of the more or successful members, and the plaintiffs in the Bostick case wanted the more successful Herbalife members excluded from the class. So as a "Get Team" member, Jennifer Ribalta is excluded from the scope of the Bostick release.

Now, an issue has been raised as to whether or not Herbalife had ever taken the position that the arbitration agreement entered into and -- entered into the rules in August 2013 operated to retroactively strip Mr. Valdez, Patricia and Jeff Rodgers and Izaar Valdez of their ability to proceed in the -- to proceed as members of the Bostick settlement class. That issue was raised and Herbalife clearly took the position that having had a complaint filed those claims asserted prior

to the arbitration agreement being incorporated into the rules, and having Herbalife actively litigate the case before any such arbitration clause was included in the rules. Herbalife made clear that it was not taking the position that it was attempting to retroactively impose the arbitration clause on 05:28 those defendants for claims that had already been asserted in the Bostick litigation.

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In any event, Your Honor, that brings us to the chart that I began with and it explains the development of that chart.

The forum selection clause became effective in January of 2010 and covers a period through August 2013. And, therefore, covers the four plaintiffs I mentioned, Felix Valdez, Jennifer and Michael Lavigne and Cody Pyle.

In August 2013, the class action agreement -- I mean the class action waiver and arbitration clause was incorporated into the agreement. Which Jennifer Lavigne, Michael Lavigne indirectly and Cody Pyle became subject to. Felix Valdez, we have to go back to 2008 to find the class action waiver and arbitration clause in his agreement.

There we see the forum selection clause, and as I indicated, all of these individuals, by virtue of having continued as members for approximately four years after the arbitration clause and class action waiver was incorporated 05:29 25 into the rules, that is between August 2013 and September 2017 when the complaint in this action was filed, are subject to those rules by incorporation into the agreement as is in the explicit terms of each agreement.

And Ms. Rodgers and each of the Valdezes, Izaar and Felix, are within the scope of the Bostick settlement.

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Now, Your Honor, if the question is which claims are subject to each of these provisions, that is, has Patricia Rodgers asserted any claims, that would not be subject to the forum selection clause. Our answer is all of her claims, because all of her claims reasonably arise from her distributor relationship with Herbalife, and the case law is very clear that forum selection clauses ought to be read liberally to encompass, not just contractual claims, but tort claims related to the relationship.

The arbitration clauses are equally broad and include not only claims arising from the distributor relationships, but claims relating to relationships with other distributors.

So to the extent that Herbalife is being sued in connection with the plaintiffs' claims for conduct of other distributors, that is the individual defendants, those are specifically included as well. The class action waiver speaks for itself as does the same language in the rules, and the Bostick settlement is an extremely broad settlement that reaches claims, known and unknown, as of the effective date of 05:32 25 the settlement.

1 So any claims, known or unknown, that existed as of September 2015, fall within the scope of that release. I think there is the possibility that one more individual plaintiff might try it take the position that a claim asserted here did not arise until after that date. I would suggest to you that 05:32 is a very tough road to hoe because they were all members for years before, or at least substantial periods of time. I think up to about at least 18 months prior to the effective date of the settlement, and actually all of the people subject to 05:32 10 Bostick settlements were members for over two years, and allege that they attended these meetings and conferences before the 11 effective date of the Bostick settlement. 12 13 As I said, I think we have attempted to answer questions 2, 3 and 4 in your order. I understand that Your 14 05:33 15 Honor may have other questions or have questions as a result of this presentation and this argument. 16 17 THE COURT: I'm fine. Can I hear from your co-counsel at this point? 18 19 MR. DROOKS: Thank you, Your Honor. 05:33 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 MR. DROOKS: Your Honor, we have a hard copy of the 22 presentation that we can provide at the end of the argument and give a copy to our co-counsel. 23 24 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 05:33 25 MR. CATLETT: Thank you, Your Honor. As I mentioned

at the outset, we represent the 44 individual defendants that have been named in this case, plaintiffs' claim here that our clients engaged in a racketeering enterprise with each other and with Herbalife, and committed mail and wire fraud and also engaged in a conspiracy to violate the racketeering statute. Now I know we're not here to talk about the merits of those claims or about the plaintiffs' allegations, but I would like

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to note that our clients take these allegations very seriously and they deny them emphatically.

What we are here to talk about today, though, is why the Southern District of Florida is the wrong forum for the plaintiffs' claims. Our clients join in and fully support the arguments that Mr. Drooks and Herbalife have made this afternoon. Our clients have similarly moved with Herbalife to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Central District of California.

I want to talk about specifically this afternoon why my clients can benefit or enforce the arbitration provision that is contained in the rules and the agreements between Herbalife and the named plaintiffs.

There's three reasons why they can do that.

First) they expressly agreed to -- named plaintiffs' expressly agreed to arbitrate the claims they assert in this Second) the plaintiff should be estopped from denying case. 05:35 25 that their claims are subject to arbitration. And third) their claims are based on a theory that the individual defendants are agents of Herbalife and that agency argument will address question 1 in the Court's notice setting hearing.

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First, with respect to the express agreement, each of the named plaintiffs expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of disputes with other members in Herbalife, including their claims in this case. Plaintiffs did not address this argument that we made in our opening brief at all in their response brief.

The 2016 version of Herbalife's rules that Mr. Drooks referred to earlier provides, in relevant part, that, quote, Herbalife and distributor agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims between them including, without limitation, disputes or claims arising out of or relating to relationships with other distributors.

My clients are similarly bound by those 2016 rules. And so we think it's wrong to even refer with respect to my clients to them as being non-signatories to the arbitration provision. My clients are bound by the arbitration provision just as the named plaintiffs are bound by the arbitration provision, and that arbitration provision clearly encompasses claims arising out of or relating to relationships with other distributors.

Count 1 of the complaint and Count 2 both are based on plaintiffs' alleged relationship with the individual

defendants, who plaintiffs' claim misrepresented that attending Herbalife events would result in greater compensation under the Herbalife compensation claim. Because those claims are centered on plaintiffs' relationships with other distributors, my clients are entitled to enforce the arbitration provision which was intended to cover claims against them such as those the plaintiffs' bring here.

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We think this case is no different than the Griggs versus SGE Management case that was cited in our papers. It's at 2015 Westlaw 11423656. In that case, the plaintiffs' brought a putative RICO class action against the direct sales company, called S G E, and several of its hired distributors. And that company happened to refer to its distributors as independent associates, or IAs.

The procedures in that case provided, similar to the rules here, that, quote, any claim between two or more IAs or between any IAs and Ignite, the direct sales company, would be subject to arbitration. And despite that the individual defendants were not technically signatories to any agreement with the plaintiffs, the Western District of Texas held that the RICO claims against the individual defendants in that case were subject to arbitration under the express terms of the arbitration agreement. The same goes here.

Moving on to agency theory and the Court asked the parties to address in its notice of hearing at question 1

whether an agent/principal relationship exists between
Herbalife and the individual defendants. And our answer to
that question is that at this stage of the proceedings, and
based only on the allegations in the complaint, and I want to
make very clear that -- and emphasize that point, that this
argument is based on the beginning stage of the proceedings
here where all you're faced with is a complaint, and at this
point you must assume that the allegations in the complaint are
true, our clients disagree with those allegations but at this
point we're stuck with them.

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The Court -- or those allegations are that Herbalife and the individual defendants are co-conspirators and have engaged in an enterprise or conducted concerted behavior. And California courts, and the rules in this case contain a California choice of law provision, so the courts or the parties with respect to this motion have focused on California law.

The California courts have explained that the essential element of establishing the existence of agency is, quote, the right of the alleged principals to control the behavior of the alleged agent. And that's in the DeSuza versus Andersack case, which is 63 Cal.App. 3d 694.

In the complaint, plaintiffs include allegations that Herbalife exercises control over the individual defendants with respect to the content, timing, and presentation of the events that are the basis of their claims. And those allegations can be found at paragraphs 118 through 120, 144 through 146, and paragraph 351 of the complaint.

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For example, paragraph 351 alleges that, quote, defendant Herbalife controls the event calendar, slotting the local STS events in around its own schedule of larger corporate sponsored events. Herbalife dictates a standardized curriculum for circle of success events, and controls the many trademarks used in those approved presentations. Herbalife lays out a tothe-minute STS agenda, which is followed rigidly in most areas.

Not only do plaintiffs allege that the individual defendants are Herbalife agents which, again, the Court has to assume is true at this point, but their theory of relief against Herbalife depends on there being an agency relationship between the defendants.

In order to violate the racketeering statute, each defendant must commit two or more predicate acts of mail or wire fraud, which the case law refers to as a pattern of racketeering. Plaintiffs must plead the existence of predicate acts with specificity under Rule 9(b). When the Court reviews the complaint, you will notice that plaintiffs do not allege a single e-mail, letter, or communication that was transmitted by Herbalife or any of its employees or executives in furtherance of the alleged fraudulent scheme. Thus, the only way that plaintiff can plead that Herbalife engaged in a pattern of

racketeering activity is to have the individual defendant statements or advertisements imputed to Herbalife, and the only way they can do that is if the individual defendants are Herbalife's agents.

Again, although Herbalife and the individual defendants will strongly contest that theory of liability, and the allegations of agency, throughout the entirety of this case, it is sufficient for present purposes to allow the individual defendants to enforce the arbitration provision.

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Finally, with respect to equitable estoppel under California law equitable estoppel applies where the complaint alleges substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by the non-signatory and another signatory, and the allegations of interdependent misconduct are founded in or intimately connected with the obligations of the underlying agreement. That standard is met here.

First, you need interdependent and concerted misconduct. At paragraph 349 of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that, quote, defendants jointly conduct, manage and control the affairs of the circle of success enterprise.

At paragraph 363 of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants have intentionally conspired and agreed to directly and indirectly conduct and participate in the conduct of the affairs of the circle of success enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Plaintiffs -- so that

satisfies the interdependent and concerted misconduct element.

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Again, we dispute those allegations, but for purposes of this motion, the Court must assume they're true.

Plaintiffs claims are also intimately connected to the obligations of Herbalife distributor agreement, rules and compensation plan. I don't think that plaintiffs' dispute that there's a contractual relationship between Herbalife and its distributors, including the named plaintiffs, or that the contractual relationship is based on the agreement, rules and compensation plan.

I also don't think that the plaintiffs dispute that the amount of money that Herbalife is required to compensate its distributors is governed by the agreement, the rules and the compensation plan.

Plaintiffs' primary allegation is that the defendants misrepresented plaintiffs' future earnings under the contract if they were to attend events. In other words, defendants up-sold the plaintiffs by promising future returns under the contract. The Court will not be able to determine whether any such misrepresentation occurred, and plaintiffs' claims cannot succeed without a careful analysis of the provisions of the contract, and whether event attendance can contribute to additional payments under the contract.

The Court need look no further than the complaint to confirm that plaintiffs' claims are intimately connected to the

contractual documents between them and Herbalife.

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At pages 69 through 70 of the complaint, the named plaintiffs have set forth what they believe the common issues are appropriate or across the class for purposes of Rule 23.

On page 70, and this is at paragraph 333 of the complaint, subsection 7, the plaintiffs indicate that one common issue is, quote, whether defendants intentionally withheld material information about the likelihood and ability of plaintiffs obtaining the promised results and monetary returns from pursuing the Herbalife business opportunity.

The only way you can figure out or determine what those promised results were, and what monetary returns plaintiffs might have been pursuing under the Herbalife business opportunity, is by referring to the Herbalife agreements, rules and compensation plan.

Similarly, at subsection 8, they say a common issue is whether defendants failed to disclose that President Team members built their downlines by using now banned methods. The only way to determine what those banned methods are is by referring to Herbalife's rules, agreements and compensation plan.

Subsection 12 they saw common issues whether distributors stacked their downlines with empty proxies to facilitate their top down manipulation of the compensation scheme. The only way for the Court to know what the

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compensation scheme is, is by referring to the rules,
        agreements and compensation plan.
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                  Finally, at subsection 18, the named plaintiffs say
        the common issue that will need to be determined in this case
        is, quote, whether defendants' disclaimers were legally
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        insufficient given the net impression created by defendants'
        activities and the explicit intentional disavowal by defendants
        and/or proxies of the substance of those disclaimers.
                                                                Those
        disclaimers are contained within Herbalife's rules, agreements,
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        and compensation plan.
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                  We also, in the alternative, have moved to transfer
        venue to the Central District of California.
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                                                       I think the
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        parties flushed out those arguments in their briefs. And Mr.
        Drooks hit on some of them this afternoon, so if Your Honor has
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        no questions, my clients respectfully request that you compel
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        the claims against them into arbitration or, alternatively,
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        that you transfer the claims against them to the Central
        District of California.
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                                 Thank you.
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                  THE COURT: Let me hear from the plaintiffs.
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                  MR. MARK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                  Your Honor, I have a small binder, it's small. I may
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        be referring to it throughout the hearing. Would it be all
        right if I approach?
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                  THE COURT: You may.
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                  MR. MARK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I just heard
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counsel argue that the plaintiffs expressly agreed to arbitrate this dispute by virtue of this 2016 version of the arbitration provision. There is absolutely no evidence in this record that any of the plaintiffs signed, saw, agreed to, checked the box, assented to this 2016 arbitration provision. None.

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The entirety of the defendants' case hinges on the fact that Herbalife retained the right in its sole and absolute discretion to amend the rules at any point in time by posting those amendments to the website and then retroactively applying those amendments to the various distributors. And that's exactly what they claim they did.

In 2016, they posted this amendment to the rules that contained this lengthy arbitration provision, and they are contending today that that 2016 amendment that they posted to the Herbalife website applies to all of the claims in this case.

There is no evidence, Your Honor, that they ever provided notice to the plaintiffs with respect to this amendment, and there's no evidence, Your Honor, that the plaintiffs ever received this notice.

Now, the preliminary inquiry here -- and this is their burden -- the preliminary inquiry here, Your Honor, is have the parties mutually agreed to arbitrate this dispute. No one signed the August 2016 agreement that they are seeking to impose. So in answer to one of your questions which was which

claims are covered by the arbitration agreement contained in the distributor agreements, the answer to that is none because the 2016 arbitration provision that they're seeking to impose was not agreed to by any of the plaintiffs in this case.

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Second, Your Honor, the arguments that you have heard Herbalife counsel, Herbalife make is the opposite, the absolute opposite of the argument they made in the Bostick case where the same law firm, Your Honor, that's representing Herbalife today, in federal court in California argued that they would never seek to do something so devious, and that's their word, not mine, Your Honor, as retroactively applied an arbitration provision to a group of people that never signed it.

Third, Your Honor, the distributor agreements are illusory. The reason they're illusory is because Herbalife retains the right in those distributor agreements to amend them unilaterally, and it does so without notice, and it does so without what the Court's have called fairness, and both notice and fairness are requirements in order to save this agreement from being illusory, all of these distributor agreements, Your Honor.

Fourth, Your Honor, the terms of use of the website provide that they supercede any other agreement relating to Herbalife's goods, services, or use of the website. This website is the same website that Herbalife requires its distributors to go to to stay up-to-date with the rules. And

it is the only policy of Herbalife that contains this superseding language, of which I'm aware.

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And Herbalife's senior director of member administration, I believe is her title, testified in this case, Your Honor, that those terms of use are incorporated into each and every distributor agreement that is at issue before your court today.

And finally, Your Honor, with respect to equitable estoppel, you heard counsel refer to the complaint. This is about, again, their burden. There's no basis for equitable estoppel here because what equitable estoppel requires in this case is reliance on the provisions of the distributor agreements and the plaintiffs' claims are not bound up with those distributor agreements.

So let's take a step back and remember the standard here, Your Honor. The defendants need to establish that there was an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence, and the defendants have failed to establish that, in fact, the November 2016 arbitration provision that no one signed or agreed to applies to the plaintiffs' claims here.

Now, Your Honor, the question is not do the terms of use conclusively apply. It's not whether the agreements are definitively illusory. That does not need to be definitively decided today, Your Honor. The question is with all reasonable 05:54 25 inferences in the plaintiffs' favor, Your Honor, have the

defendants shown, by a preponderance of the evidence again, that an agreement to arbitrate was made. 3

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So, let me drill down a little bit more, Your Honor. The agreement to arbitrate the 2016 agreement, no one acknowledged receipt of it. No one checked a box saying that he or she received it. And Your Honor, if you turn to tab 1 of the binder you'll see a little blue flag. This is the deposition testimony of Roxanne Romans. This is the senior director of member policy administration of Herbalife.

She testified that the plaintiffs when I asked her, "Is it your understanding that the plaintiffs are bound by these rules, regardless of whether or not they received notification?" Her answer to that is, "Yes."

When I asked her whether any investigation was done as to whether the distributors actually received any of these notifications, Your Honor, the answer was, "I don't remember." We are talking about the basic constitutional rights to a jury trial, we are talking about the basic right to be in a courtroom, and, of course, the class waiver, which is the real basis, the real reason they're filing this motion.

Bostick and the Bostick contradiction. You've heard counsel refer to the Bostick case. What Herbalife argued in Bostick, Your Honor, about three years ago, this is textbook judicial estoppel. This is textbook opportunistic flip-05:56 25 flopping taking one position when it's convenient to take that positions, two-and-a-half years ago, and taking the exact opposite position in court today.

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Bostick covers a class and damages going from April 2009 through December of 2014. That's the general class of Bostick. When the Bostick settlement was entered into, Your Honor, and I'll draw your attention to tab 3, and all of these documents are on the record, Your Honor. The third page of tab 3 provides for the Bostick exclusion that counsel was referring to, 1.13.2. "Also, excluded from the settlement class are all Herbalife members or distributors who have agreed to be subject to the arbitration provisions of the arbitration agreement."

That was contained in the member application revised during or after September of 2013. So there's an exclusion, an express exclusion in the -- out of the class of Bostick that says we're not going to apply Bostick to anyone that agreed to be bound -- I'm sorry, that agreed to be subject to arbitration provisions.

So, Your Honor, at tab 4 you'll see a colloquy between counsel for the objectors of Bostick and counsel for Herbalife. And in that colloquy, counsel for the objectors pointed out that a sort of bizarre idea: What happens if Herbalife at some point in the future has the audacity to take the position that the arbitration agreement applies retroactively to those members, such as Patti Rodgers, one of the plaintiffs in this case, that that arbitration agreement would apply retroactively

to her, even though she never agreed to arbitration, because Herbalife has a unilateral right to amend their contracts and impose those changes on anybody at any point in time.

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If they sought to do that, then the theory would be that the entire Bostick class would be extinguished. So the objectors pointed that out. And at page 12, Your Honor, of tab 4, counsel for the objectors stated the way Herbalife functions is that when they implemented it, meaning the arbitration provision in September 2013, that it became part of the deal. That was the concern raised by the objectors.

Counsel for Herbalife, his name is Judd Matz (ph.), he's with the same firm that Herbalife is being represented by today, the bottom of page 15 he states, and again, Your Honor, I'm at tab 4, "It's not fair to characterize what we're doing in this Court, in any court so publically and so openly as a devious effort to manipulate the record. If we were to do what he is speculating we were to do," meaning counsel for the objectors, "and to bind all of the other people who are not signatories, there would be such an avalanche of adverse consequences, including from this Court, that I think there's no basis whatsoever to accept his concerns on that front."

That was the statement made by counsel for Herbalife. You don't have to worry about that, Judge. We would never do something like that, and at tab 5, Your Honor, you'll see the minutes from the Court where the Court states at the bottom of

tab 5, "To the extent the objectors contend that all current Herbalife members and distributors are subject to the 2013 arbitration agreement via this clause, the Court disagrees. The objectors have cited no authority for the proposition that these members and distributors could be subject to an 06:00 arbitration provision contained within an agreement they neither agreed to nor signed at the time they joined Herbalife simply because the company retains the right to amend its rules and policies, nor is it clear to the Court that a binding 06:00 10 contract, such as an arbitration agreement, could be included within the definition of a corporate rule or policy, yet, here 11 12 we are, Your Honor, about three years later, and that's exactly 13 what Herbalife is trying to do.

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And again, Judge, there are three elements to judicial estopped. Clearly inconsistent with the prior position, yes. Successful in asserting that position, yes. Deriving an unfair advantage or seeking to derive an unfair advantage, yes, Your The three criteria are met and judicial estoppel should Honor. apply here, Your Honor.

I want to touch on Herbalife's ability to unilaterally amend this contract in its sole and absolute discretion, which is in every agreement. Tab 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 of the binder I've handed you, those are the various agreements, and they each contain a provision in sum or substance, and I'm looking at now 06:01 25 tab 6, which is Mr. Felix Valdez's application that says that

the document and such other rules and policies as Herbalife has published, or in the future may publish, together with such modifications and amendments as Herbalife shall make from time to time in its sole and absolute discretion are hereby incorporated into this agreement of distributorship in its most recently published form. So what Herbalife does when these people sign these applications is they say, "We are reserving the right to amend this at any point in the future, and then incorporate it into the agreement you signed, even though these documents don't even exist at the time you're signing this distributor application."

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So this is, on its face, Judge, an illusory contract. This is an illusory contract. The right to unilaterally amend a contract renders it illusory, unless it is subject to two things, Your Honor, notice and fairness, and in every case where the unilateral right to amend was upheld, there was a real actual notice provision.

In the Harris case, Your Honor, which is cited in everybody's papers, the amendment required 30 days written notice before it came into effect, and the modification had to be signed and agreed to by both parties. In Peleg, Your Honor, which is 204 Cal.App. 1425, and both Harris and Peleg are in the binder I handed you, Your Honor, the Court found that the contract was not illusory under California law where there was a provision requiring 30 days written notice.

1 And these are their cases, Your Honor.

Now, Roxanne Romans, again, this senior member of policy administration, she's admitted, she doesn't know whether the plaintiffs ever even got the notice. And she has stated that it doesn't matter whether they did or didn't. And, again, Your Honor, there's no evidence. And I am not aware, Your Honor, of any case that exists where the defendants moved to compel arbitration and provide no evidence that the plaintiffs ever even got notice of the amendment.

So we don't have notice, Your Honor. Notice and fairness are required. There's neither.

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Fairness. Fairness means you're not going to retroactively apply a change to someone who never affirmatively assented to it. That's exactly what Herbalife is doing. They're taking the 2016 arbitration provision, which is different from the 2015 arbitration provision, which is different from the 2014 arbitration provision, which is different from the 2013 arbitration provision. They're taking the 2016 arbitration provision and they are seeking to apply it to all of the conduct and all of the allegations in the complaint, the allegations that occurred in 2014, the allegations that occurred in 2015, the allegations that occurred in 2013, et cetera, Judge. So that's exactly what

they're doing. They're retroactively applying it.

The terms of use, Your Honor, this really drives home

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what a mess Herbalife has made of all of this. It's not -- you
        don't need to decide whether it's the website terms of use that
        apply, or whether it's this other provision that may apply,
        whether it's the 2014 arbitration provision, or the 2008
        arbitration provision that Mr. Valdez signed and which is, on
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        its own, substantively unconscionable. The two thousand and --
        I'm sorry, the website terms of use were last revised in
        February of 2017. The reasons the terms of use are so
        important, Your Honor, the website terms of use, is because the
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        entire -- and I've been practicing this phrase, Your Honor --
        sine qua non, okay, of the defendant's case is that the
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        plaintiffs are required to stay apprised of these amendments to
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        the rules by going onto the website. That's how they stay
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        apprised. Roxanne Romans testified that the only way the
        members could even stay apprised of these rules is by going to
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        that website. The only way that these distributors could
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        conduct business is by going to that website. And the terms of
        use which are found at tab 2, Your Honor will see they're last
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        revised February 2nd, 2017, and they provide that this
        agreement sets forth the legal terms and conditions governing
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        your use of this website which, again, Your Honor, they say you
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        have to use to stay apprised of the rules, and your purchase or
        use of any Herbalife goods, services, referred to as "the
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        offerings." That is what their own terms of use say, and those
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06:07 25 terms of use also provide that they expressly supercede all
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other prior arrangements, understanding, negotiations and discussions.

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The terms of use, of course, do not contain an arbitration provision. They provide a clause that requires any lawsuit to be brought in federal district court. Considering the defendant's burden here, Your Honor, to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an agreement to arbitrate made, we don't believe that they have met that burden.

With respect to equitable estoppel and agency, Your Honor asked a very good question earlier relating to agency. Herbalife's own documents, which are in the rules of conduct that they've attached to their motion to compel arbitration, expressly provide that distributors are not agents. In fact, the language is significantly broader than that.

Rule 3.1.2 of the rules state that, "A distributor is an independent contractor. Distributors conduct their Herbalife businesses as self-employed, independent contractors. A distributor is not an employee, agent, franchisee, securities holder, joint venturer, fiduciary, or beneficiary of Herbalife or any other distributor. As independent contractors," it continues, "distributors do not have the rights or benefits that employees or agents of Herbalife may have and will not make any claim to the contrary."

So that's Herbalife's own document and that's found at

-- the Bates stamp is HLF 000682, that's in version, I believe, 33 of their rules of conduct. So we don't have an agency relationship here.

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And they've, of course, submitted no evidence to Your Honor that there is an agency relationship, and they've not argued in their papers that the basis for compelling that -- the individual defendants compel arbitration is by virtue of this agency relationship. They've not made that argument. They're trying to hinge their argument on equitable estoppel.

The goal of the KPMG case, which I included in tab 15 of the binder, Your Honor, 173 Cal.App. 4209 recites directly on point. The question for the Court is, with respect to these individual defendants, are the claims asserted by the plaintiffs against the non-signatories the 43, 46 individual defendants, quote, bound up with the contractual obligations of the agreement?

The argument that the individual defendants make is exactly the same that the defendant made in the KPMG case, that it's only logical they would have to rely on the distributor agreement to seek to impose liability on the individual defendants because that formed the predicate of the relationship.

The Court expressly rejected that concept, Your Honor, and reiterated that the plaintiffs' allegations must, quote, rely on the agreement, not simply the fact that the agreement

exists, and with respect to it being inextricably intertwined, again, we can look to the KPMG case for guidance.

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In that case, the defendants argue that there was a tax shelter scheme that could only be accomplished via these operating agreements that contained an arbitration provision, and the Court still rejected that argument because the complaint was not relying on the relevant agreement. The complaint is not attached to -- I'm sorry, the distributorship agreement is not attached to the complaint, it's not referred to in the complaint. There is no provision. There was no right. There was no obligation within that distributorship agreement that the plaintiffs are seeking to impose on the individual defendants.

So, Your Honor, it's our position that the defendants have failed to meet their burden. The motion to compel arbitration should be denied.

And briefly, Your Honor, on the issue of transfer.

The motion to transfer is only really founded on claims brought by four out of seven -- I'm sorry, four out of eight of the plaintiffs against three out of 47 of the defendants.

Of course, the predicate to the forum selection analysis is whether there's a valid forum selection clause in the first instance. I defer that we believe the contract is illusory, is entirely illusory, so we don't think that that exists.

1 The forum selection clause that they rely on provides for -- it doesn't say any lawsuit arising out of or relating It says any claim, doesn't define claim, but there's a capital C so it implies there's definition. There is no definition in the documents. Any claim should be brought in 06:13 the Federal District Court in California.

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Now, the Atlantic Marine case that the defendants rely on, that case provides that where you have a valid forum selection clause, that the parties -- that the Court should disregard the private interest factors, that is that the plaintiffs' choice of forum and all those other private interest factor and accept that the forum selection clause is going to govern at least with respect to those private interest factors.

That doesn't apply in the case where you have some parties that agreed to a forum, an outside forum, and some parties that did not agree to an outside forum.

Here, Your Honor, we do have to consider the private interest factors. We have four plaintiffs that reside in Florida, more than any other state. We have 20 defendants that reside in Florida, far more than any other state. complaint is peppered with allegations relating to all of the conduct that occurred in Florida. There are 37 different event flyers that are alleged in the complaint and that are attached 06:14 25 to the complaint. And we're talking about things such as the

convenience of the parties. All of that inures to Florida being the appropriate forum. 3 And of course, Judge, the vast majority of the parties in this action never, never agreed to bring this case in California. There are four out of, again, 50-something parties 06:15 that did. 7 So, Your Honor, we believe, again, their burden, they have failed to meet their burden. And that the motion to transfer should be denied as well. 06:15 10 If Your Honor wishes me to deal with Bostick, I'm 11 happy to. 12 THE COURT: I think I have enough information to rule on the matters before me, Counsel. 13 14 Thank you very much, Your Honor. MR. MARK: THE COURT: All right. I have two docket entries, 06:15 15 docket entry 62 and docket entry number 63. 16 17 Now, there are certain plaintiffs that have signed the distribution agreement that had a valid arbitration provision, 18 19 and that provision is limited by the implied covenant of good 06:16 20 faith and dealing. I know there's this argument that there 21 ought to be an illusory contract, I don't find that argument 22 convincing. Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted as 23 24 to claims against Herbalife made by plaintiffs Jean Lavigne, Michael Lavigne, Cody Pyle and Felix Valdez. The motion to 06:16 25

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compel arbitration is denied in all other respects and to any
        other plaintiffs because certain plaintiffs signed a
        distributor agreement with a valid forum selection clause and
        given the balance of the factors that I need to determine in
        their favor. The defendants' motion to transfer venue is
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        granted as to the claims involving Jen Ribalta, Patricia
        Rodgers, Jeff Rodgers and Izaar Valdez.
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                  The motion to transfer venue is denied in all other
        respects. And the claims against the individual defendants
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        remain.
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                  A written order will issue. Thank you very much,
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        Counsel.
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                  MR. MARK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                   (Thereupon, the above hearing was concluded.)
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## CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that the foregoing is an accurate transcription of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 08/24/2018 DATE COMPLETED GIZELLA BAAN-PROULX, RPR, FCRR